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An agent-based model for firms’ dynamics is developed. The model consists of firm
agents with identical characteristic parameters and a bank agent. Dynamics of those agents
is described by their balance sheets. Each firm tries to maximize its expected profit with
possible risks in market. Infinite growth of a firm directed by the “profit maximization”
principle is suppressed by a concept of “going concern”. Possibility of bankruptcy of firms
is also introduced by incorporating a retardation effect of information on firms’ decision.
The firms, mutually interacting through the monopolistic bank, become heterogeneous in
the course of temporal evolution. Statistical properties of firms’ dynamics obtained by
simulations based on the model are discussed in light of observations in the real economy.
§1. Introduction
An agent-based model is used to elucidate complex phenomena encountered in
a wide variety of social and economic systems.1) The agent is a natural extension of
the atomic concept worked out for describing physical systems. Agents have internal
structures characterized by different parameters. Agents are made so intelligent as to
be autonomous; for instance, an agent has a capability to adapt itself to surrounding
conditions. Also agents interact with each other according to simple rules. A complex
system is thus regarded as an assembly of interacting agents.
It is a dream for physicists to explain complex phenomena happening in the
economic world based on a simple model. A promising model is that consisting
of interacting agents.2), 3), 4) Gallegati and his collaborators4), 5), 6) constructed a
workable model, and showed that it successfully reproduced a set of stylized facts
including the distribution with a power-law tail of firms’ size and a Laplace-type
distribution of the growth rate of firms.
A large collection of firm agents with identical characteristic parameters and a
monopolistic bank constitute the model. Dynamics of the agents are characterized
by their balance sheets. Each firm tries to maximize its expected profit with possible
risks in market. The firms, mutually interacting through the bank, become hetero-
geneous in the course of temporal evolution. Possibility of bankruptcy of a firm is
also taken into account. Such a microscopic model, once established, enables us to
investigate interplay between behavior of individual firms and macroscopic trend of
economy. We are now in a stage to be capable of calibrating the model thanks to ac-
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cumulation of results for statistical properties of dynamics of real firms.7), 8), 9), 10), 11)
The objective of the present study is to develop an agent-based model for dy-
namics of firms along the line laid by Gallegati et al.4), 5), 6) We reconstruct the
model to elucidate the conceptual ingredients. Compromise between the two con-
cepts, “profit maximization” and “going concern” plays a key role along with decision
of firms using imperfect information on their financial conditions. Simulations based
on the model are then carried out for statistical properties of firms’ dynamics and
the results so obtained are discussed in light of observations in the real economy. A
preliminary account of the present work has been given in Ref. 12).
§2. Agent-Based Modeling
The agent-based modeling of firms’ dynamics due to Gallegati et al. provides
us with a sound starting point. The system consists of a swarm of firm agents with
identical characteristic parameters and a monopolistic bank agent, as depicted in
Fig. 1. The firms interact to each other only through the bank; direct interactions
between firms due to business network are not taken into account. We first modify
the model to make it most rational within the original framework; each firm draws
up its production plan with all information available at hand. And then we introduce
retardation of information on firms’ dynamics. To present our model we will follow
the same notations and the same values for the model parameters in Ref. 5) wherever
it is possible.
2.1. Balance Sheet Dynamics
Dynamics of the agents are described in terms of balance sheets (see Fig. 1). A
firm agent i has total assets Ki,t and liabilities Li,t from the bank at the beginning
of a time period t. According to the accounting equation, equity capital Ai,t of the
firm must equal assets minus liabilities. On the other hand, the bank agent has a
balance sheet on which its aggregate supply of credit, Lt =
∑
i Li,t, is balanced by
sum of total deposits Dt and equity capital Et. Stocks and flows are two kinds of
basic variables to construct system dynamics models. The balance sheets have only
stock variables so that they are just snapshots of financial conditions of the agents
in time. Flow variables such as profit and investment determine evolution of the
economic system.
2.2. Firm Agent
Figure 2 depicts the basic activity of a firm; it features a bakery. The firm
purchases materials to make products and sells them to obtain money. Subtraction
of material cost MC from the revenue R gives added value Y for the firm. The firm
inevitably needs plants and employees for its production activity. To calculate profit,
therefore, we further have to subtract financial and labor costs necessary to keep the
capital K and the labor L. One of fundamental ideas in the economic theory is that
Y is a function of input variables, K and L:
Y = F (K,L) . (2.1)
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Fig. 1. Agent-based model consisting of multiagents of firms and a single agent of bank.
Fig. 2. Production activity of a firm.
For simplicity in modeling firms’ dynamics, we concentrate on the financial aspect
of the production function (2.1) and assume the added value linearly scales to the
capital input:
Y = φK, (2.2)
where the proportionate φ is taken as φ = 0.1. Figure 3 validates this modeling for
the production function.
At the beginning of a given time period t the i-th firm changes its total asset
Ki,t to maximize the expected value of profit. This strategic behavior of the firm,
called “profit maximization”, is a well-known hypothesis in economics since Adam
Smith, although it has not been confirmed yet.
The profit of a firm is fixed at the end of each period such as
pii,t = ui,tYi,t − ri,tKi,t = (ui,tφ− ri,t)Ki,t, (2.3)
where ri,t is an interest rate for the financial cost. The parameter ui,t reflects uncer-
tainty in a market. Since a market consists of a huge number of economic degrees of
freedom, determination of the selling price becomes inevitably stochastic. We also
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Fig. 3. Added value Yi,t versus fixed assets Ki,t for the listed Japanese firms in 2006.
assume that ui,t is independent of the firm size in harmony with Gibrat’s law. We
thus take ui,t as a uniform random number in (0,2); this is an arbitrary choice as
adopted in the original model.
If a firm takes an aggressive production plan, it has a finite probability of
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy of a firm is defined at the end of a period t by the condition,
Ai,t = Ai,t−1 + pii,t−1 < 0. (2.4)
Substitution of (2.3) into (2.4) results in the following formula for the bankruptcy
probability:
PB (Ki,t) =
{
ri,tKi,t−Ai,t
2φKi,t
for Ki,t>
Ai,t
ri,t
,
0 otherwise.
(2.5)
We thus see there is a upper bound in the size for a firm to be free from bankruptcy.
Another management policy, called “going concern”, prevents a firm from ex-
panding its size infinitely; a firm desires to survive forever. We assume here that
firms adopt a solid production plan with a safety factor σ(≤ 1):
Ki,t = σ
Ai,t
ri,t
. (2.6)
This choice compromises the two directly-opposed economic ideas.
The interest rate for each firm is then determined through demand and supply
balance in credit market between firms and the bank. The firm requests the bank
to finance the following amount of money derived from (2.6):
Ldi,t = Ki,t −Ai,t =
(
σ
ri,t
− 1
)
Ai,t. (2.7)
On the other hand, credit is granted to the firm by the bank in proportion to its
relative size in the preceding period as
Lsi,t = Lt
Ki,t−1∑
i
Ki,t−1
, (2.8)
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Balancing (2.7) and (2.8) gives the formula for the interest rate,
ri,t =
σAi,t
Lsi,t +Ai,t
. (2.9)
Such an equilibrium mechanism to determine the interest rate is depicted in Fig. 4.
The maximum rate is given by rmax = σ. If the firm obtain more credit from the
bank, the interest rate decreases, and vice versa.
Fig. 4. Determination of the interest rate for the financial cost of a firm.
2.3. Bankruptcy
Firm agents with the behavioral rules above-mentioned show no bankruptcy.
Real firms, however, are always afraid of being bankrupted. To incorporate a pos-
sibility of bankruptcy for firms into the model, we replace the equity capital of the
current period by that of the preceding period in (2.6):
Ki,t = σ
Ai,t−1
ri,t
. (2.10)
Firms thus determine their production plans with delayed information. This re-
placement turns over the conservative attitude of firms when they are in a recession
phase. The firms incidentally take speculative management actions. We arbitrarily
set σ = 1/2, which enables us to make a smooth connection with the original for-
mulae. For instance, the equation (2.10) is deduced by omitting the intensive terms,
independent of the firm size, in the corresponding equation in Ref. 5).
The delay of information is one of causes of bankruptcy for firms. Alternatives
include existence of unexpected risk and propagation of bankruptcy akin to a chain
reaction. Here the possible risk is supposed to be totally predictable by specifying a
definite range for ui,t in (2.3) , but nobody can avoid unexpected risk in real business.
In fact, firms are linked to each other through transaction with supply of credit. If
a large firm is bankrupted, then a credit risk shock will propagate over the network.
The chain reaction bankruptcy arising from direct interactions among firms is out
of scope in the present study.
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2.4. Bank Agent
We assume that the bank expands its business subject to minimum requirement
of a prudential rule with a risk coefficient α:
Lt =
∑
i
Li,t =
Et
α
. (2.11)
The Basel committee of the Bank for International Settlements introduced an inter-
national capital adequacy standard called Basel I in 1988.∗) It requires that each
bank has its capital being at least 8% of the total asset. So we take here α = 0.08.
The bank derives a profit through investing its money in firms. However its net
profit Πt is given by subtracting financial costs from the sum of interests:
Πt =
∑
i
ri,tLi,t − rt (1− ω)Dt − rtEt −
∑
i
′
Bi,t, (2.12)
where
rt =
1
N
∑
i
ri,t. (2.13)
The second and third terms in the right-hand side of (2.12) stand for interests paid
to depositors and to investors, respectively; the profit margin ω is set as ω = 0.002.
The last term takes account of additional loss due to bad debts stemming from
bankruptcy of firms:
Et = Et−1 +Πt−1. (2.14)
2.5. Comparison with the Previous Model
Bankruptcy costs with quadratic dependence on added value were introduced
in the original modeling due to Gallegati et al.4), 5), 6) It was necessary to prevent
firms from growing unlimitedly. Here such a rather obscure idea is replaced by
the transparent principle of “going concern”. Also the original model suffers from
the followings: i) financial quantities at the beginning of a period are not clearly
distinguished from those at the end of the period, ii) the bankruptcy probability of a
firm is not prohibited to take a negative value, iii) extensive and intensive quantities
are mixed up in the formulae. The present modification of the model cures these
problems.
§3. Representative Agent
We first study a system comprising a single ideal firm interacting with the bank
agent; firms are thus represented by the single agent. This representative agent
model, neglecting heterogeneity of agents, is a traditional approach in economics.
Figure 5 shows that both agents grow exponentially. This is an intrinsic property of
the present model as seen below.
∗) The Basel I is to be replaced by the Basel II with more refined rules.
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Fig. 5. Numerical results for the representative agent model. The left and right panels show tempo-
ral change of the equity capital of the representative firm and that of the bank agent, respectively.
For a market with no fluctuations in the selling price (ui,t = 1) and in the interest
rate (ri,t = r), one can obtain an analytic solution for each agent. The evolutionary
equations for the ideal firm and bank agents now read
At+1 = At + (φ− r)Kt =
(
1 + σ
φ− r
r
)
At, (3.1)
Et+1 = Et + ωr
(
Lt −Kt
)
=
(
1− ωr + ωr
α
)
Et. (3.2)
Then analytic solutions to (3.1) and (3.2) are obtained as
At ∝ exp
[
t ln
(
1 + σ
φ− r
r
)]
, (3.3)
Et ∝ exp
[
t ln
(
1− ωr + ωr
α
)]
. (3.4)
Equating the two formulae for the growth rate, one can determine r as
r =
−1 +√1 + 4φξ
2ξ
' φ (1− φξ) = 0.0995, (3.5)
where
ξ = 2ω
(
1
α
− 1
)
= 0.046 1. (3.6)
The growth rate derived from (3.5) explains the results in Fig. 5 very well.
Figure 6 shows results obtained by simulations with N = 2, 3, 1000. We see that
heterogeneity of firms spontaneously arises from competition among firms interacting
through the bank.
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Fig. 6. Temporal change of the total assets of firms in the system with N = 2, 3, 1000. For N =
1000, ten firms were selected arbitrarily.
§4. Simulations with Multiagents
We executed numerical simulations in the present model with the same charac-
teristic parameters and initial conditions for the agents as those in Ref. 5), but with
a much larger number of firms (N = 100, 000).
4.1. Growing Economy
As shown in the left panel of Fig. 7, the growth of the bank is very steady for the
rational firms; the growth rate is indistinguishable from that for the representative
firm. The corresponding panel of Fig. 8 shows replacement of the rational firms by
the irrational ones gives rise to bankruptcy of firms and hence idiosyncratic shocks
in the bank dynamics. Heterogeneity of firms in their sizes simultaneously emerges
as demonstrated in the right panels of Figs. 7 and 8. The size distribution of the
rational firms is well fitted to the log-normal distribution. In contrast, the sizes of
the irrational firms are asymptotically distributed in a power-law form,
Rank ∝ K−µi,t . (4.1)
The exponent varies from µ ' 2 to µ ' 1 as time proceeds. Also bankruptcy of firms
happens not uniformly in time.
We thus see the size distribution of firms and the temporal evolution of the bank
critically depend on whether firms make full use of available information on their
financial conditions or not in determining a production plan for the next period.
4.2. Stationary Economy
If we control the macroscopic economy by keeping the size of the bank fixed, we
have a stationary state for the irrational firms. The distribution of firms’ size is a
power law with µ ' 2 as shown in the left panel of Fig. 9. Comparison of it with the
right panel of Fig. 8 reveals an intimate relationship between behavior of individual
firms and macroscopic trend of economy; this manifests a micro-macro loop.
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Fig. 7. Results of a simulation for firms with perfect information. The left panel shows temporal
change of the equity capital of the bank; the right panel, the cumulative distributions of the size
of firms at three periods with each fitted to the log-normal distribution (solid curve).
Fig. 8. Same as Fig. 7, but for firms with imperfect information.
Fig. 9. Size distribution of actual firm agents in a stationary economy with (left panel) and without
(right panel) the interaction with the bank.
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One can terminate the interaction by assuming
ri,t = φ. (4.2)
This assumption reduces the present agent-based model to a random growth model:
Ai,t+1 = Ai,t +
ui,t − 1
2
Ai,t−1. (4.3)
The profit for firms vanishes on average in this situation. The simulation based on
(4.3) certainly results in a stationary distribution of firms’ size with a power-law tail
as shown in the right panel of Fig. 9.∗) But the exponent close to unity is totally
different from that for the interacting firms. We thus see that the interactions among
firms through the bank give rise to profound changes in the statistical properties of
firms as manifested by the variation of the power-law exponent.
4.3. Synchronized Bankruptcy
Figure 10 demonstrates bankruptcies of firms take place in a synchronized way
with macroscopic shocks reflected in the equity capital of the bank. Bankruptcy
of a large firm triggers such a chain reaction of bankruptcy of firms in the present
model which takes into account interactions among firms. The large bankruptcy
first gives rise to large bad debt for the bank. Then the equity capital of the bank
shrinks and accordingly money supply to firms by the bank decreases. This leads to
increase of interest rates for loans from the bank and hence decrease of profits for
firms. Financially fragile firms with a low equity ratio Ai,t/Ki,t are thus strongly
influenced by the bankruptcy of the large firm.
Fig. 10. Bankruptcies of firms synchronized with macroscopic shocks reflected in the equity capital
of the bank.
§5. Concluding Remarks
We have clarified the economic ideas built in the model by Gallegati et al. Here
firms harmonize the “profit maximization” principle with the “going concern” con-
∗) Note that Ai,t is simply proportional to Ki,t under the condition (4.2).
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cept when making their production plans. The retardation of information in firms’
decision-making leads to bankruptcy of firms. Successful results of the original model
are carried over to the present model.
In fact, firms form a complex network through their business transactions. A firm
obtains materials from suppliers (upstream firms) and sells its products to customers
(downstream firms). Recent studies clearly show the business network has the scale-
free nature.13), 14) One can easily guess that some firms have a number of connections
acting as hubs. More precisely, it is characterized by a power-law distribution of
the number of links (degree) originating from a given node. Why and how such
a fascinating network has been formed through the daily activities of firms? To
make the present agent-based model for firms’ dynamics more predictable, it is thus
inevitable to take an explicit account of direct interactions between firms over the
business network. Addressing to these issues is one of possible ways to proceed for
econophysics.15), 16)
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